Security / News explained
Kiro CLI's file-permission fix also needs a look at older history
AWS's November 10 advisory covers locally readable Kiro transcripts and prompt history. Version 2.27.0 fixes the issue, with follow-up for existing files and older Amazon Q history.
AWS published a November 10, 2026 advisory about Kiro CLI creating session transcripts and prompt history with overly broad permissions. CVE-2026-124848 could let another local user on the same host read prompts, model responses and tool output, including credentials or source code present in those records. [1]
The affected range is version 1.16.0 through versions before 2.27.0 on macOS and Linux. AWS identifies 2.27.0 as the fixed version. Kiro CLI was previously called Amazon Q Developer CLI, so an inventory that considers only the current product name can miss relevant history. [1]
The linked Kiro 2.27.0 changelog is dated October 1, 2026 and mentions tighter access to local Kiro state. The November event is the security disclosure; these sources do not describe a newly released November 10 version. [2]
A useful transcript can also be sensitive
The local-user condition is central to the announcement. This is a file-access problem on a machine where another user can read the affected records. It should not be presented as evidence that a remote stranger can retrieve every Kiro conversation, or that a particular developer's work has already been exposed.
Our interpretation is that AI session records deserve the same practical attention as other development artifacts that can contain sensitive material. A conversation may bring together questions, generated explanations and tool output. Its value for resuming work is exactly why access to the saved record matters.
Consider a hypothetical shared development host. Two engineers use separate operating-system accounts, and one account's saved assistant history is readable by the other. Their separation at sign-in would not settle access to that file. This example illustrates the advisory's local boundary; it is not a report about an affected organization.
The potential contents also change the response. A generic prompt about formatting a function and a transcript containing authentication material call for different follow-up if inappropriate access is established. The vulnerability notice alone cannot tell an organization which category describes its own files.
Existing state is part of the fix
AWS recommends upgrading and launching the upgraded CLI once so that existing session files are restricted to their owner. People who used Amazon Q Developer CLI 1.16.0 through 1.19.x also need to delete or restrict the legacy .aws/amazonq/.cli_bash_history file. [1]
That is an important distinction between replacing an executable and addressing the state it previously created. A successful installation record answers which software was deployed. Completion of the vendor's existing-file action answers a different question about the saved material left behind.
On Linux, the umask manual describes a creation mask used when new files and directories receive permissions. It also explains that a parent directory's default access-control list changes how those creation permissions are determined. This is background about file creation, not a substitute for checking the application-specific remediation. [3]
The practical implication is to distinguish the treatment of future files from the treatment of earlier ones. Tightening defaults for the next session does not, by itself, demonstrate what happened to a transcript saved previously. An update plan should give both questions an owner.
The bulletin offers temporary owner-only file restrictions and a restrictive creation mask; legacy-history cleanup remains separately applicable. [1]
Keep the review proportional to the evidence
We would treat the device's operating system, installed version, prior use of the renamed CLI and local-account access as the starting context. A machine used by one person and a shared host can have different exposure conditions, even when their application versions match.
Where sensitive records may have been accessible, the organization's security team can assess the relevant period and whether access warrants further response. That assessment should rely on actual evidence and local policy. A public advisory establishes a software weakness, not a count of copied files or a confirmed credential theft.
There is a broader engineering lesson here: saved assistant state is part of the product's security boundary. The useful completion record covers the fixed software, its first launch and any applicable legacy history. The conversation may feel temporary; the file containing it can remain after the terminal closes.
Sources + further reading
Source dates describe the original material. Publication above is the date this Zyel article went live.
- CVE-2026-124848: Kiro CLI transcript and prompt-history permissionsAWS Security · Checked Nov 11, 2026
- Kiro CLI 2.27.0 changelogKiro · Checked Nov 11, 2026
- umask(2): File mode creation maskLinux man-pages project · Checked Nov 11, 2026
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